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Thứ Năm, 30 tháng 4, 2020
📄 Cherry Tran shared a memory
Thứ Ba, 28 tháng 4, 2020
📄 Nhannice Nguyen shared Lien Eth Nguyen's post
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Chủ Nhật, 26 tháng 4, 2020
🔗 Nhannice Nguyen shared a link
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RapidScan: The Multi-Tool Website Vulnerabilities Scanner With Artificial Intelligence
RapidScan's Features:
For Your Infomation about RapidScan:
RapidScan supports checking for these vulnerabilities:
RapidScan's screenshots:
How to contribute? If you want to contribute to the author. Read this.
Related links
- One-step installation.
- Executes a multitude of security scanning tools, does other custom coded checks and prints the results spontaneously.
- Come of the tools include
nmap
,dnsrecon
,wafw00f
,uniscan
,sslyze
,fierce
,lbd
,theharvester
,dnswalk
,golismero
etc executes under one entity. - Saves a lot of time, indeed a lot time!
- Checks for same vulnerabilities with multiple tools to help you zero-in on false positives effectively.
- Legends to help you understand which tests may take longer time, so you can Ctrl+C to skip if needed.
- Association with OWASP Top 10 2017 on the list of vulnerabilities discovered. (under development)
- Critical, high, large, low and informational classification of vulnerabilities.
- Vulnerability definitions guides you what the vulnerability actually is and the threat it can pose
- Remediations tells you how to plug/fix the found vulnerability.
- Executive summary gives you an overall context of the scan performed with critical, high, low and informational issues discovered. (under development)
- Artificial intelligence to deploy tools automatically depending upon the issues found. for eg; automates the launch of
wpscan
andplecost
tools when a wordpress installation is found. (under development) - Detailed comprehensive report in a portable document format (
*.pdf
) with complete details of the scans and tools used. (under development)
For Your Infomation about RapidScan:
- Program is still under development, works and currently supports 80 vulnerability tests.
- Parallel processing is not yet implemented, may be coded as more tests gets introduced.
RapidScan supports checking for these vulnerabilities:
- DNS/HTTP Load Balancers & Web Application Firewalls.
- Checks for Joomla, WordPress and Drupal
- SSL related Vulnerabilities (HEARTBLEED, FREAK, POODLE, CCS Injection, LOGJAM, OCSP Stapling).
- Commonly Opened Ports.
- DNS Zone Transfers using multiple tools (Fierce, DNSWalk, DNSRecon, DNSEnum).
- Sub-Domains Brute Forcing.
- Open Directory/File Brute Forcing.
- Shallow XSS, SQLi and BSQLi Banners.
- Slow-Loris DoS Attack, LFI (Local File Inclusion), RFI (Remote File Inclusion) & RCE (Remote Code Execution).
RapidScan's Requirements:
- Kali Linux, Parrot Security OS, BlackArch... Linux distros that based for pentesters and hackers.
- Python 2.7.x
RapidScan Installation:
RapidScan's screenshots:
RapidScan helping menu |
RapidScan Intro |
RapidScan Outro |
How to contribute? If you want to contribute to the author. Read this.
Thứ Bảy, 25 tháng 4, 2020
Osueta: A Simple Python Script To Exploit The OpenSSH User Enumeration Timing Attack
About Osueta?
Osueta it's a simple Python 2 script to exploit the OpenSSH User Enumeration Timing Attack, present in OpenSSH versions <= 7.2 and >= 5.*. The script has the ability to make variations of the username employed in the bruteforce attack, and the possibility to establish a DoS condition in the OpenSSH server.
Read more: OpenSSH User Enumeration Time-Based Attack
The bug was corrected in OpenSSH version 7.3.
Authors of Osueta:
- c0r3dump3d: coredump@autistici.org
- rofen: rofen@gmx.de
Osueta's Installation
For Linux users, open your Terminal and enter these commands:
If you're Windows users, follow these steps:
- Install Python 2.7.x from Python.org first. On Install Python 2.7.x Setup, choose Add python.exe to Path.
- Download Osueta-master zip file.
- Then unzip it.
- Open CMD or PowerShell window at the Osueta folder you have just unzipped and enter these commands:
pip install python-nmap paramiko IPy
python osueta.py -h
Advice: Like others offensive tools, the authors disclaims all responsibility in the use of this script.
Osueta help menu:
Osueta's examples:
A single user enumeration attempt with username variations:
python2 osueta.py -H 192.168.1.6 -p 22 -U root -d 30 -v yes
A single user enumeration attempt with no user variations a DoS attack:
python2 osueta.py -H 192.168.1.6 -p 22 -U root -d 30 -v no --dos yes
Scanning a C class network with only one user:
python2 osueta.py -H 192.168.1.0/24 -p 22 -U root -v no
Scanning a C class network with usernames from a file, delay time 15 seconds and a password of 50000 characters:
python2 osueta.py -H 192.168.1.0/24 -p 22 -L usernames.txt -v yes -d 15 -l 50
Related news
OWASP ZAP Project - Zed Attack Proxy Team Releases Two Initiatives
The Zed Attack Proxy team is pleased to announce two recently released initiatives:
ZAP In Ten
The team have just launched a new series of videos called 'ZAP in Ten' in conjunction with AllDayDevOps.ZAP in Ten is a series of short form videos featuring Simon Bennetts, project lead of the OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) project. Each video highlights a specific feature or resource for ZAP.
ZAP API Docs
As part of OWASP's participation in Google's Season of Docs, the ZAP project has had @sshniro working on API documentation. The first iteration of the documentation is now live. It includes Java, Python, and shell example snippets all presented in a responsive and accessible design. Which we will continue to build on in the future.Big thanks to Nirojan for his efforts on this wonderful initiative! Congratulations and thanks to Google Open Source for helping to bring the open source and technical writer communities together!Related posts
Thứ Sáu, 24 tháng 4, 2020
Blockchain Exploitation Labs - Part 1 Smart Contract Re-Entrancy
Why/What Blockchain Exploitation?
In this blog series we will analyze blockchain vulnerabilities and exploit them ourselves in various lab and development environments. If you would like to stay up to date on new posts follow and subscribe to the following:Twitter: @ficti0n
Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/c/ConsoleCowboys
URL: http://cclabs.io
http://consolecowboys.com
As of late I have been un-naturally obsessed with blockchains and crypto currency. With that obsession comes the normal curiosity of "How do I hack this and steal all the monies?"
However, as usual I could not find any actual walk thorough or solid examples of actually exploiting real code live. Just theory and half way explained examples.
URL: http://cclabs.io
http://consolecowboys.com
As of late I have been un-naturally obsessed with blockchains and crypto currency. With that obsession comes the normal curiosity of "How do I hack this and steal all the monies?"
However, as usual I could not find any actual walk thorough or solid examples of actually exploiting real code live. Just theory and half way explained examples.
That question with labs is exactly what we are going to cover in this series, starting with the topic title above of Re-Entrancy attacks which allow an attacker to siphon out all of the money held within a smart contract, far beyond that of their own contribution to the contract.
This will be a lab based series and I will show you how to use demo the code within various test environments and local environments in order to perform and re-create each attacks for yourself.
Note: As usual this is live ongoing research and info will be released as it is coded and exploited.
Note: As usual this is live ongoing research and info will be released as it is coded and exploited.
If you are bored of reading already and just want to watch videos for this info or are only here for the demos and labs check out the first set of videos in the series at the link below and skip to the relevant parts for you, otherwise lets get into it:
Background Info:
This is a bit of a harder topic to write about considering most of my audience are hackers not Ethereum developers or blockchain architects. So you may not know what a smart contract is nor how it is situated within the blockchain development model. So I am going to cover a little bit of context to help with understanding. I will cover the bare minimum needed as an attacker.
A Standard Application Model:
- In client server we generally have the following:
- Front End - what the user sees (HTML Etc)
- Server Side - code that handles business logic
- Back End - Your database for example MySQL
A Decentralized Application Model:
Now with a Decentralized applications (DAPP) on the blockchain you have similar front end server side technology however
- Smart contracts are your access into the blockchain.
- Your smart contract is kind of like an API
- Essentially DAPPs are Ethereum enabled applications using smart contracts as an API to the blockchain data ledger
- DAPPs can be banking applications, wallets, video games etc.
A blockchain is a trust-less peer to peer decentralized database or ledger
The back-end is distributed across thousands of nodes in its entirety on each node. Meaning every single node has a Full "database" of information called a ledger. The second difference is that this ledger is immutable, meaning once data goes in, data cannot be changed. This will come into play later in this discussion about smart contracts.
Consensus:
The blockchain of these decentralized ledgers is synchronized by a consensus mechanism you may be familiar with called "mining" or more accurately, proof of work or optionally Proof of stake.
Proof of stake is simply staking large sums of coins which are at risk of loss if one were to perform a malicious action while helping to perform consensus of data.
Proof of stake is simply staking large sums of coins which are at risk of loss if one were to perform a malicious action while helping to perform consensus of data.
Much like proof of stake, proof of work(mining) validates hashing calculations to come to a consensus but instead of loss of coins there is a loss of energy, which costs money, without reward if malicious actions were to take place.
Each block contains transactions from the transaction pool combined with a nonce that meets the difficulty requirements. Once a block is found and accepted it places them on the blockchain in which more then half of the network must reach a consensus on.
The point is that no central authority controls the nodes or can shut them down. Instead there is consensus from all nodes using either proof of work or proof of stake. They are spread across the whole world leaving a single centralized jurisdiction as an impossibility.
Things to Note:
First Note: Immutability
- So, the thing to note is that our smart contracts are located on the blockchain
- And the blockchain is immutable
- This means an Agile development model is not going to work once a contract is deployed.
- This means that updates to contracts is next to impossible
- All you can really do is createa kill-switch or fail safe functions to disable and execute some actions if something goes wrong before going permanently dormant.
- If you don't include a kill switch the contract is open and available and you can't remove it
Second Note: Code Is Open Source
- Smart Contracts are generally open source
- Which means people like ourselves are manually bug hunting smart contracts and running static analysis tools against smart contract code looking for bugs.
When issues are found the only course of action is:
- Kill the current contract which stays on the blockchain
- Then deploy a whole new version.
- If there is no killSwitch the contract will be available forever.
Now I know what you're thinking, these things are ripe for exploitation.
And you would be correct based on the 3rd note
Third Note: Security in the development process is lacking
- Many contracts and projects do not even think about and SDLC.
- They rarely add penetration testing and vulnerability testing in the development stages if at all
- At best there is a bug bounty before the release of their main-nets
- Which usually get hacked to hell and delayed because of it.
- Things are getting better but they are still behind the curve, as the technology is new and blockchain mostly developers and marketers. Not hackers or security testers.
Forth Note: Potential Data Exposure via Future Broken Crypto
- If sensitive data is placed on the blockchain it is there forever
- Which means that if a cryptographic algorithm is broken anything which is encrypted with that algorithm is now accessible
- We all know that algorithms are eventually broken!
- So its always advisable to keep sensitive data hashed for integrity on the blockchain but not actually stored on the blockchain directly
Exploitation of Re-Entrancy Vulnerabilities:
With a bit of the background out of the way let's get into the first attack in this series.
Re-Entrancy attacks allow an attacker to create a re-cursive loop within a contract by having the contract call the target function rather than a single request from a user. Instead the request comes from the attackers contract which does not let the target contracts execution complete until the tasks intended by the attacker are complete. Usually this task will be draining the money out of the contract until all of the money for every user is in the attackers account.
Example Scenario:
Let's say that you are using a bank and you have deposited 100 dollars into your bank account. Now when you withdraw your money from your bank account the bank account first sends you 100 dollars before updating your account balance.
Well what if when you received your 100 dollars, it was sent to malicious code that called the withdraw function again not letting the initial target deduct your balance ?
With this scenario you could then request 100 dollars, then request 100 again and you now have 200 dollars sent to you from the bank. But 50% of that money is not yours. It's from the whole collection of money that the bank is tasked to maintain for its accounts.
Ok that's pretty cool, but what if that was in a re-cursive loop that did not BREAK until all accounts at the bank were empty?
That is Re-Entrancy in a nutshell. So let's look at some code.
Example Target Code:
function withdraw(uint withdrawAmount) public returns (uint) {
1. require(withdrawAmount <= balances[msg.sender]);
2. require(msg.sender.call.value(withdrawAmount)());
3. balances[msg.sender] -= withdrawAmount;
4. return balances[msg.sender];
}
Line 1: Checks that you are only withdrawing the amount you have in your account or sends back an error.
Line 2: Sends your requested amount to the address the requested that withdrawal.
Line 3: Deducts the amount you withdrew from your account from your total balance.
Line 4. Simply returns your current balance.
Ok this all seems logical.. however the issue is in Line 2 - Line 3. The balance is being sent back to you before the balance is deducted. So if you were to call this from a piece of code which just accepts anything which is sent to it, but then re-calls the withdraw function you have a problem as it never gets to Line 3 which deducts the balance from your total. This means that Line 1 will always have enough money to keep withdrawing.
Let's take a look at how we would do that:
Example Attacking Code:
function attack() public payable {
1. bankAddress.withdraw(amount);
}
2. function () public payable {
3. if (address(bankAddress).balance >= amount) {
4. bankAddress.withdraw(amount);
}
}
Line 1: This function is calling the banks withdraw function with an amount less than the total in your account
Line 2: This second function is something called a fallback function. This function is used to accept payments that come into the contract when no function is specified. You will notice this function does not have a name but is set to payable.
Line 3: This line is checking that the target accounts balance is greater than the amount being withdrawn.
Line 4: Then again calling the withdraw function to continue the loop which will in turn be sent back to the fallback function and repeat lines over and over until the target contracts balance is less than the amount being requested.
Review the diagram above which shows the code paths between the target and attacking code. During this whole process the first code example from the withdraw function is only ever getting to lines 1-2 until the bank is drained of money. It never actually deducts your requested amount until the end when the full contract balance is lower then your withdraw amount. At this point it's too late and there is no money left in the contract.
Setting up a Lab Environment and coding your Attack:
Hopefully that all made sense. If you watch the videos associated with this blog you will see it all in action. We will now analyze code of a simple smart contract banking application. We will interface with this contract via our own smart contract we code manually and turn into an exploit to take advantage of the vulnerability.
Download the target code from the following link:
Then lets open up an online ethereum development platform at the following link where we will begin analyzing and exploiting smart contracts in real time in the video below:
Coding your Exploit and Interfacing with a Contract Programmatically:
The rest of this blog will continue in the video below where we will manually code an interface to a full smart contract and write an exploit to take advantage of a Re-Entrency Vulnerability:
Conclusion:
More articles
Thứ Năm, 23 tháng 4, 2020
Linux Stack Protection By Default
Modern gcc compiler (v9.2.0) protects the stack by default and you will notice it because instead of SIGSEGV on stack overflow you will get a SIGABRT, but it also generates coredumps.
In this case the compiler adds the variable local_10. This variable helds a canary value that is checked at the end of the function.
The memset overflows the four bytes stack variable and modifies the canary value.
The 64bits canary 0x5429851ebaf95800 can't be predicted, but in specific situations is not re-generated and can be bruteforced or in other situations can be leaked from memory for example using a format string vulnerability or an arbitrary read wihout overflowing the stack.
If the canary doesn't match, the libc function __stack_chck_fail is called and terminates the prorgam with a SIGABORT which generates a coredump, in the case of archlinux managed by systemd and are stored on "/var/lib/systemd/coredump/"
❯❯❯ ./test
*** stack smashing detected ***: terminated
fish: './test' terminated by signal SIGABRT (Abort)
❯❯❯ sudo lz4 -d core.test.1000.c611b7caa58a4fa3bcf403e6eac95bb0.1121.1574354610000000.lz4
[sudo] password for xxxx:
Decoding file core.test.1000.c611b7caa58a4fa3bcf403e6eac95bb0.1121.1574354610000000
core.test.1000.c611b : decoded 249856 bytes
❯❯❯ sudo gdb /home/xxxx/test core.test.1000.c611b7caa58a4fa3bcf403e6eac95bb0.1121.1574354610000000 -q
We specify the binary and the core file as a gdb parameters. We can see only one LWP (light weight process) or linux thread, so in this case is quicker to check. First of all lets see the back trace, because in this case the execution don't terminate in the segfaulted return.
We can see on frame 5 the address were it would had returned to main if it wouldn't aborted.
Happy Idea: we can use this stack canary aborts to detect stack overflows. In Debian with prevous versions it will be exploitable depending on the compilation flags used.
And note that the canary is located as the last variable in the stack so the previous variables can be overwritten without problems.
The memset overflows the four bytes stack variable and modifies the canary value.
The 64bits canary 0x5429851ebaf95800 can't be predicted, but in specific situations is not re-generated and can be bruteforced or in other situations can be leaked from memory for example using a format string vulnerability or an arbitrary read wihout overflowing the stack.
If the canary doesn't match, the libc function __stack_chck_fail is called and terminates the prorgam with a SIGABORT which generates a coredump, in the case of archlinux managed by systemd and are stored on "/var/lib/systemd/coredump/"
❯❯❯ ./test
*** stack smashing detected ***:
fish: './test' terminated by signal SIGABRT (Abort)
[sudo] password for xxxx:
Decoding file core.test.1000.c611b7caa58a4fa3bcf403e6eac95bb0.1121.1574354610000000
core.test.1000.c611b : decoded 249856 bytes
❯❯❯ sudo gdb /home/xxxx/test core.test.1000.c611b7caa58a4fa3bcf403e6eac95bb0.1121.1574354610000000 -q
We specify the binary and the core file as a gdb parameters. We can see only one LWP (light weight process) or linux thread, so in this case is quicker to check. First of all lets see the back trace, because in this case the execution don't terminate in the segfaulted return.
We can see on frame 5 the address were it would had returned to main if it wouldn't aborted.
Happy Idea: we can use this stack canary aborts to detect stack overflows. In Debian with prevous versions it will be exploitable depending on the compilation flags used.
And note that the canary is located as the last variable in the stack so the previous variables can be overwritten without problems.
Continue reading
Thứ Tư, 22 tháng 4, 2020
Httpgrep - Scans HTTP Servers To Find Given Strings In URIs
A python tool which scans for HTTP servers and finds given strings in URIs.
Usage
$ httpgrep -H
--==[ httpgrep by nullsecurity.net ]==--
usage
httpgrep -h <args> -s <arg> [opts] | <misc>
opts
-h <hosts|file> - single host or host-range/cidr-range or file containing
hosts, e.g.: foobar.net, 192.168.0.1-192.168.0.254,
192.168.0.0/24, /tmp/hosts.txt
-p <port> - port to connect to (default: 80)
-t - use TLS/SSL to connect to service
-u <URI> - URI to search given strings in, e.g.: /foobar/, /foo.html
(default /)
-s <string|file> - a single string or multile strings in a file to find in
given URIs, e.g. 'tomcat 8', '/tmp/igot0daysforthese.txt'
-b <bytes> - num bytes to read from response. offset == response[0].
(default: 64)
-x <threads> - num thre ads for concurrent checks (default: 50)
-c <seconds> - num seconds for socket timeout (default: 2.5)
-i - use case-insensitive search
-v - verbose mode (default: quiet)
misc
-H - print help
-V - print version information
Author
noptrix
Notes
- quick'n'dirty code
- httpgrep is already packaged and available for BlackArch Linux
- My master-branches are always stable; dev-branches are created for current work.
- All of my public stuff you find are officially announced and published via nullsecurity.net.
License
Check docs/LICENSE.
Disclaimer
We hereby emphasize, that the hacking related stuff found on nullsecurity.net are only for education purposes. We are not responsible for any damages. You are responsible for your own actions.
via KitPloit
This article is the property of Tenochtitlan Offensive Security. Verlo Completo --> https://tenochtitlan-sec.blogspot.com
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Linux Command Line Hackery Series - Part 6
Welcome back to Linux Command Line Hackery series, I hope you've enjoyed this series so far and would have learned something (at least a bit). Today we're going to get into user management, that is we are going to learn commands that will help us add and remove users and groups. So bring it on...
Before we get into adding new users to our system lets first talk about a command that will be useful if you are a non-root user.
Command: sudo
Syntax: sudo [options] command
Description: sudo allows a permitted user to execute a command as a superuser or another user.
Since the commands to follow need root privileges, if you are not root then don't forget to prefix these commands with sudo command. And yes you'll need to enter the root password in order to execute any command with sudo as root.
Command: useradd
Syntax: useradd [options] username
Description: this command is used for creating new user but is kinda old school.
Lets try to add a new user to our box.
[Note: I'm performing these commands as root user, you'll need root privileges to add a new user to your box. If you aren't root then you can try these commands by prefixing the sudo command at the very beginning of these command like this sudo useradd joe. You'll be prompted for your root password, enter it and you're good to go]
useradd joe
To verify that this command has really added a user to our box we can look at three files that store a users data on a Linux box, which are:
/etc/passwd -> this file stores information about a user separated by colons in this manner, first is login name, then in past there used to be an encrypted password hash at the second place however since the password hashes were moved to shadow file now it has a cross (x) there, then there is user id, after it is the user's group id, following it is a comment field, then the next field contains users home directory, and at last is the login shell of the user.
/etc/group -> this file stores information about groups, that is id of the group and to which group an user belongs.
/etc/shadow -> this file stores the encrypted password of users.
Using our command line techniques we learned so far lets check out these files and verify if our user has been created:
cat /etc/passwd /etc/group /etc/shadow | grep joe
In the above screenshot you can notice an ! in the /etc/shadow, this means the password of this user has not been set yet. That means we have to set the password of user joe manually, lets do just that.
Command: passwd
Syntax: passwd [options] [username]
Description: this command is used to change the password of user accounts.
Note that this command needs root privileges. So if you are not root then prefix this command with sudo.
passwd joe
After typing this command, you'll be prompted password and then for verifying your password. The password won't show up on the terminal.
Now joe's account is up and running with a password.
The useradd command is a old school command, lets create a new user with a different command which is kinda interactive.
Command: adduser
Syntax: adduser [options] user
Description: adduser command adds a user to the system. It is more friendly front-end to the useradd command.
So lets create a new user with adduser.
adduser jane
as seen in the image it prompts for password, full name and many other things and thus is easy to use.
OK now we know how to create a user its time to create a group which is very easy.
Command: addgroup
Syntax: addgroup [options] groupname
Description: This command is used to create a new group or add an existing user to an existing group.
We create a new group like this
addgroup grownups
So now we have a group called grownups, you can verify it by looking at /etc/group file.
Since joe is not a grownup user yet but jane is we'll add jane to grownups group like this:
addgroup jane grownups
Now jane is the member of grownups.
Its time to learn how to remove a user from our system and how to remove a group from the system, lets get straight to that.
Command: deluser
Syntax: deluser [options] username
Description: remove a user from system.
Lets remove joe from our system
deluser joe
Yes its as easy as that. But remember by default deluser will remove the user without removing the home directory or any other files owned by the user. Removing the home directory can be achieved by using the --remove-home option.
deluser jane --remove-home
Also the --remove-all-files option removes all the files from the system owned by the user (better watch-out). And to create a backup of all the files before deleting use the --backup option.
We don't need grownups group so lets remove it.
Command: delgroup
Syntax: delgroup [options] groupname
Description: remove a group from the system.
To remove grownups group just type:
delgroup grownups
That's it for today hope you got something in your head.
Continue reading
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